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Section 1404(a), "Where It Might Have Been
Brought": Brought By Whom?
Michael J. Waggoner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1404(a)' of Title 28 authorizes one federal district
court to transfer a civil action to another such court "[flor the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice."
The transferee court must be one "where [the action] might
have been brought."2 The usefulness of the transfer mechanism
depends in significant part on the interpretation of that limita-
tion. Perfectly sensible transfers may be precluded by an overly
strict interpretation; too generous a construction may give too
little guidance to litigants and judges so that at best time is
wasted litigating transfers and at worst transfers are improvi-
dently granted. For over a quarter century the federal courts
have suffered from the overly-strict interpretation given this
limitation in Hoffman v. Blaski,3 rejecting the overly-generous
interpretation proposed by the dissent. This article proposes a
new interpretation not considered in Blaski to make that limita-
tion operate in a more principled fashion.
The new interpretation is based on answering the question
suggested by the "where it might have been brought" restriction:
"Brought by whom?" The answer should be, "Brought by the
party seeking the transfer,"4 rather than the superficially ap-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. A.B., Stanford University;
LL.B., Harvard Law School.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)(1982). Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of par-
ties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
2. Id.
3. 363 U.S. 335 (1960). Blaski was decided with a companion case, Sullivan v.
Behimer. There were two issues in Blaski, the meaning of section 1404(a), and a question
about appellate procedure. The dissenters in Blaski did not reach the former because
they believed the latter dispositive. The Blaski dissenters did address the meaning of
section 1404(a) in their dissent to Behimer. In the interest of clarity the dissent in
Behimer will be called the Blaski dissent.
4. In the rare case of neither party requesting the transfer, where the judge sua
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pealing "Brought by the plaintiff," the answer assumed without
examination by both the majority and the dissent in Blaski. Of
course in the rare case of plaintiff seeking a transfer the inter-
pretations are identical; the differences become significant in the
more common case of a defendant seeking transfer.
There are two versions of the proposed interpretation, one
supplementing and the other replacing the prevailing
interpretation.
As a supplement, the proposed interpretation will permit
many transfers which would be in the interests of justice but
which are arbitrarily precluded by the prevailing interpretation.
The list of transferee forums (limited under the prevailing inter-
pretation to those in which plaintiff could have brought this ac-
tion against this defendant) would be expanded when the de-
fendant seeks the transfer to include those where the defendant
could have brought an action on the same subject matter against
the plaintiff. Thus the supplementing version of the proposed
interpretation expands the "where it might have been brought"
restriction.
If the proposed interpretation replaces that now prevailing,
the restriction will be redirected. Many transfers will be newly
allowed, as under the supplemental version. Many transfers now
allowed will be precluded. Transfers requested by defendant
would be allowed only to places where defendant could have
brought an action on the same subject matter against the plain-
tiff, not to places where plaintiff could have brought this action
against the defendant. The two versions should be evaluated
separately. A possible rejection of the more radical replacing
version should not require rejection of the more modest supple-
menting version.
This article will first describe the operation and purpose of
section 1404(a), then discuss three possible interpretations of
"where it might have been brought." Briefly, these interpreta-
tions interpolate after that phrase, "by the plaintiff without the
defendant's consent," "by the plaintiff with the defendant's con-
sent," or "by the party seeking the transfer." These three inter-
pretations are those of the Blaski majority, of the Blaski dissent,
and of this article, respectively. The proposed interpretation will
sponte orders the transfer, either party could object that the transferee forum is not one
where an action on that subject matter could have been brought against the objecting
party.
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be shown to be consistent with the statute's purpose, language,
legislative history, and judicial interpretation.
II. SECTION 1404(a)
Section 1404(a) authorizes transfer of civil actions from one
federal district court to another, even though venue and per-
sonal jurisdiction5 were proper where the action was filed. Such
transfers are to be made, much as under the common law doc-
trine of forum non conveniens,8 "for the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice."' 7 Under forum non con-
veniens a court dismisses or stays an action; under section
1404(a) the court transfers the action.
The decision to transfer is more complicated than the deci-
sion to dismiss or stay. To dismiss or stay an action, a court
need only determine that the action should not proceed in that
court. To transfer requires a further inquiry: "If not here,
where?" Section 1404(a) provides that an action may be trans-
ferred only to a court "where it might have been brought."8
That last requirement, the subject of this article, "has engen-
dered much controversy in the courts."9
5. Cf. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962) (interpreting what is now 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982)) (transfer allowed although transferring court lacked both per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue); Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1973) (transfer
allowed although transferring court lacked personal jurisdiction), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
989 (1974).
6. The federal rule of forum non conveniens prior to enactment of section 1404(a) is
discussed in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The circumstances for apply-
ing section 1404(a) and forum non conveniens may differ. See Parsons v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71 (1963) (section 1404(a) transfer not required, even though
state court in same state as federal court had earlier dismissed under forum non con-
veniens a case concerning the same subject between the same parties); Norwood v. Kirk-
patrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) (section 1404(a) transfer upheld even though forum non con-
veniens dismissal would have been improper); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981) (application of forum non conveniens where the more convenient forum
is a foreign court).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). Consideration of the "convenience" and "justice" re-
quirement is beyond the scope of this article.
8. Id.
9. Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1958) (on rehearing, withdrawing
earlier opinion), afl'd, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). That case's history reflects the controversy. a
transfer was ordered by a Texas district court, which was upheld by the Fifth Circuit. Ex
parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Blaski v. Davidson, 355 U.S. 872
(1957). It was then reluctantly accepted by an Illinois district court, and initially upheld
by the Seventh Circuit, before being rejected by the Seventh Circuit on rehearing and by
the Supreme Court.
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III. INTERPRETING "WHERE IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT"
The United States Supreme Court in Blaski divided over
the two interpretations adopted by various lower courts of
"where [the action] might have been brought." The majority
held that that phrase refers to the time the action was com-
menced, not later when the motion to transfer was made. Trans-
fer would be allowed only to districts in which, at the time the
action was commenced, plaintiff could have satisfied personal ju-
risdiction and venue over the defendant.10 The dissent would
have extended the phrase to the time when the motion to trans-
fer was made. Because a defendant may create personal jurisdic-
tion and venue by consent,11 the dissent would allow the defend-
ant, via a consent in his motion to transfer, to make a particular
district one "where [the action] might have been brought.
1 2
Let us examine these two interpretations, taking first the
common ground and then the areas of disagreement. The com-
mon ground concerns transfers sought by plaintiff. In this situa-
tion restricting transfer of an action to courts "where it might
have been brought" would seem to be intended to preserve nor-
mal concepts of personal jurisdiction and venue. There would be
little point in having those concepts if plaintiff could, after filing
in a court satisfying them, transfer to any other court without
regard to them.13 Thus, transfers sought by plaintiffs should be
allowed only to courts where venue and personal jurisdiction
would be satisfied for this plaintiff's assertion of this claim
against this defendant. This is the interpretation adopted in the
circuit courts of appeal even before Blaski,14 and it would seem
10. This interpretation had previously been adopted in the circuit courts of appeal
only by the Seventh Circuit in the two cases affirmed in Blaski. 363 U.S. at 342-44.
11. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); National
Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
12. 363 U.S. at 369 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Decisions of circuit courts of appeal
adopting this interpretation were, in chronological order, Paramount Pictures, Inc. v.
Rodney, 186 F.2d Ill (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951); Anthony v.
Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 955 (1952); In re Josephson,
218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954); Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d at 737.
13. It would still be necessary to satisfy the "convenience" and "justice" require-
ments, but more than that would be required for venue and personal jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (1982); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980).
14. See Blackmar v. Guerre, 190 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1951), aff'd on other grounds,
342 U.S. 512 (1952); Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950); Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950).
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to be acceptable to both majority and dissent. The disagreement
concerns transfers sought by the defendant.
A. The Blaski Majority
The majority would allow transfers at defendant's request
only to courts where plaintiff might have brought the action, i.e.,
where plaintiff could have satisfied personal jurisdiction and
venue. This approach does not always produce a sensible result.
In order to illustrate, let us consider a hypothetical dispute
between two corporations, Interstate and Local. A claim between
the two corporations satisfies federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Interstate, let us suppose, is engaged in continuous and substan-
tial business in every state of the Union; in each state it has
factories, offices, stores, and employees. Local is a retail store
(not franchised15 ) which sells over the counter to the ultimate
consumer and which buys from local wholesalers. Assume fur-
ther that the claim arose at Local's place of business.
If Local is the plaintiff, the case would have satisfied per-
sonal jurisdiction" and venue 17 in every district, so "where it
might have been brought" would include all federal district
courts. Interstate can have the case transferred anywhere. This
is true even though plaintiff Local has no contacts with any
other district and might be seriously inconvenienced by the
transfer. Thus the majority's interpretation provides no protec-
tion to a local plaintiff suing an interstate defendant.
If Interstate is the plaintiff, personal jurisdiction will be sat-
isfied only in Local's state, 8 so Local cannot have the case trans-
ferred. This is true, even though plaintiff Interstate has substan-
tial contacts in all other districts and would not likely be
seriously inconvenienced by any transfer. Thus the majority's in-
terpretation allows an interstate plaintiff, even with no apparent
15. Cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (court at franchisor's
headquarters may obtain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state franchisee).
16. If defendant's contacts with the forum are sufficiently continuous and substan-
tial, defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction even for claims unrelated to those
contacts. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982) provides, "A corporation may be sued. . . [where] it
is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business . .. ."
18. Venue, but not personal jurisdiction, would be satisfied in plaintiff Interstate's
residence if subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)
(1982).
72 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
interest in resisting a transfer, to prevent transfer sought by a
local defendant. This result-an interstate defendant sued by a
local plaintiff has many potential transferee districts to which it
may force the plaintiff to go, but a local defendant sued by an
interstate plaintiff has few or none-seems anomalous.
"These hypotheticals may be interesting," the reader may
be thinking, "but are they realistic? Why would a local defend-
ant want a transfer? Would a court transfer a local plaintiff su-
ing an interstate defendant?" Yes, the hypotheticals are realis-
tic, they are based (within normal limits of poetic license) on
two leading Supreme Court decisions interpreting section
1404(a), Blaski19 and Van Dusen v. Barrack.2 0 A local defendant
might want to transfer a case to consolidate it with others to
spread the costs of defense. A court might similarly transfer a
local plaintiff to ease consolidation.
The preceding analysis considered only the "where it might
have been brought" restriction. Might the problem of anomalous
transfer opportunities, created by the Blaski majority's interpre-
tation of that restriction, be solved by the "convenience" and
"justice" requirement?
In the "local plaintiff v. interstate defendant" hypothetical,
"convenience" and "justice" might have been adequate safe-
guards, as any transfer of such a plaintiff is likely to cause the
plaintiff substantial inconvenience, since by hypothesis that
plaintiff has contacts only in the forum. Congress was not con-
tent to rely solely on a court's estimate of "convenience" and
"justice," however, because it added the "where it might have
been brought" restriction. Yet that restriction is given no pur-
poseful content under the prevailing interpretation. The pro-
posed interpretation, if it replaced that now prevailing, would
provide such purposive content.
A different situation is presented when a local defendant
seeks transfer of an action brought by an interstate plaintiff.
Here some transfers might well satisfy the "convenience" and
"justice" requirement, yet no transfer is allowed under the pre-
vailing interpretation of "where it might have been brought,"
even though no policy is served by such an interpretation. The
19. A patent holder sued a smll business for infringement. A patent holder may be
viewed as interstate because of the nation-wide rights the patent creates.
20. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). A personal injury action was held transferable from plain-
tiffs residence to the accident site, without inquiry as to the extent of plaintiff's inter-
state activities or contacts with the accident site.
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proposed interpretation provides a consistent and coherent pol-
icy to the two requirements, "convenience" and "justice" on the
one hand and "where it might have been brought" on the other,
a consistency and coherence which are lacking under the Blaski
majority's interpretation of "where it might have been brought."
Thus far we have considered only a two-party action. Might
the advantages of consolidating multi-party litigation justify the
conventional Blaski interpretation over the proposed interpreta-
tion? Consider the facts of Van Dusen v. Barrack.21 An airliner
bound from Boston to Philadelphia crashed on takeoff. Over 100
wrongful death actions were filed in the federal court for Massa-
chusetts; over 45 were filed in the federal court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.22 Defendants in the Pennsylvania cases
sought a transfer to Massachusetts.23 Because it is clear that the
Pennsylvania plaintiffs could have satisfied personal jurisdiction
and venue in the Massachusetts court, the transfer would satisfy
the "where it might have been brought" requirement as conven-
tionally interpreted. However, it is uncertain whether an accused
tort-feasor can assert personal jurisdiction at the accident site
over non-resident victims and their estates.24 If not, the replac-
21. Id.
22. Id. at 614.
23. Id.
24. Limits on service of process from federal courts generally follow those of the
state in which the federal court sits. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (f); see also Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc). But see National Equip. Rental
v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (federal law determines who is "an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process" under FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)). Thus
determination of federal personal jurisdiction requires reference to the personal jurisdic-
tion of state courts.
State assertions of jurisdiction must satisfy both the state long-arm statute and the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. State long-arm statutes often permit
the assertion of jurisdiction based on the commission of a tortious act. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 2-209(2) (Smith-Hurd 1983). Such statutes would allow the victim to
assert jurisdiction over the tort-feasor, but they would not help the tort-feasor assert
jurisdiction over the victim (unless the tort-feasor had a counterclaim against the vic-
tim). The provisions of such statutes for the transaction of any business might be appli-
cable, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 2-209(1) (Smith-Hurd 1983), based on the vic-
tim's purchase or use of the product or service which produced the injury, but that
would require an expansive reading of the statute. Other statutes authorize jurisdiction
to the extent allowed by the Constitution. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West
1973), and thus present no statutory problems in asserting personal jurisdiction.
State assertions of jurisdiction must also satisfy the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. While a tort victim might seem to lack "minimum contacts." Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Court has approved assertion
of jurisdiction against multiple claimants in circumstances such that no other forum
seemed available. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
74 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1988
ing version of the proposed interpretation would not permit the
Pennsylvania cases to be transferred to Massachusetts.25 The
proposed interpretation thus may reduce the potential of section
1404(a) as an aid to consolidation of multiple-district litigation.
This argument for the conventional interpretation must be
put in perspective. The inability of section 1404 to deal with
problems of multi-district litigation is hardly surprising because
that section was not designed for that purpose. There are other
methods of dealing with the problems of multi-district litigation.
For example, section 140726 allows increased judicial control of
complex litigation. Other developments have increased the in-
centives for the parties to consolidate litigation. In addition,
consolidation may be impractical without regard to section
1404(a). Barriers such as lack of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion as to some of the related cases may prevent complete con-
solidation. Differences in substantive law applied to cases origi-
nally filed in different courts may eliminate any benefits from
consolidation.2  Finally, the starting point should be
remembered. If, as a matter of normal rules of venue and per-
sonal jurisdiction, we do not permit the tort-feasor to summon
the victim to the accident site, why should such a result be per-
mitted through a transfer under section 1404(a)? To put the
(1950) (upheld assertion of jurisdiction over non-resident beneficiaries of a trust in an
action by trustee to settle accounts, in effect an action for a declaratory judgment of no
liability). Whether this case would be extended to tort victims is unclear. Cf. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (in an action for damages, a state
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident members of plaintiff class who
lack minimum contacts with the state if the court provides such procedural protections
as notice to known class members, opportunities to be heard and to opt-out, and assur-
ances of adequate representation).
25. The transfers would be authorized under the supplementing version of the pro-
posed interpretation, because that version allows all transfers allowed under the prevail-
ing interpretation, and this transfer is allowed under the prevailing interpretation. Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). This section authorizes transfer of cases without any
restriction equivalent to Section 1404(a)'s "where it might have been brought," but it
applies only to pretrial. Decisions on transfers are made by the judicial panel on mul-
tidistrict litigation, rather than by a district judge.
27. A few examples: The high costs of litigation encourage consolidation. The incen-
tive for plaintiff(s) to pursue separate actions, each hoping to use another's victory as
non-mutual collateral estoppel, has been reduced by Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979) (courts should be reluctant to let a plaintiff who could have joined in a
prior action use the results of that action as non-mutual collateral estoppel). There may
even be some risk that the waiting plaintiff may be estopped by another's defeat. See
Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1485 (1974).
28. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 643-46 (1964).
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question another way, if the need to facilitate consolidation is so
great as to justify transfer, is it not also sufficient to justify per-
sonal jurisdiction at the accident site? If so, the proposed inter-
pretation will present no problems to consolidation. Thus, for
complex litigation as for simple litigation, the majority's inter-
pretation is undesirable.
B. The Blaski Dissent
The interpretation suggested by the dissent in Blaski is
even less satisfactory. They would interpret "where [the action]
might have been brought" as including districts for which-after
the action has begun-defendant waives objections to personal
jurisdiction or venue.2" This interpretation would, as a practical
matter, eliminate that restriction whenever it is the defendant
who seeks a transfer (as is normally the case). Of course an in-
terpretation of a provision of a statute which effectively elimi-
nates that provision should not be favored.
There is a fundamental incongruity in the dissent's inter-
pretation of the "where it might have been brought" restriction.
That statutory restriction protects the party resisting the trans-
fer, normally the plaintiff; yet the dissent would allow the de-
fendant to waive the restriction. It is nonsensical to allow one
party to waive the opposing party's rights.
While the dissent may be quite persuasive in suggesting
that the question is not as simple as portrayed by the majority,30
the dissent fails to think through its proposed alternative.
C. The Proposed Interpretation
This article proposes a third interpretation of "where [the
action] might have been brought." That phrase, this article sug-
gests, refers to any district where the party seeking the transfer
might have brought the action. If it is the plaintiff who is seek-
ing the transfer, this proposed third interpretation is the same
as that of the Blaski majority and dissent: Transfers are author-
ized to districts in which personal jurisdiction and venue of the
original action would have been satisfied when that action was
commenced. If it is the defendant who is seeking the transfer,
this proposed third interpretation is different from those of both
29. 363 U.S. at 369 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. Scholars too have criticized the Blaski majority. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3845 (1986).
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the Blaski majority and the dissent: Transfers would be author-
ized to districts in which personal jurisdiction and venue would
have been satisfied for a hypothetical action on the same subject
matter brought by the true defendant against the true plaintiff.
For example, if the true plaintiff were seeking damages or an
injunction, in the hypothetical action the true defendant would
be seeking a declaratory judgment of non-liability. 1
The proposed interpretation may be illuminated by apply-
ing it to the facts of Blaski. In that case Illinois plaintiffs
brought an action for patent infringement against Texas defend-
ants in a federal court in Texas. The Texas defendants' motion
for transfer under section 1404(a) to an Illinois federal court ul-
timately was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court because the
Illinois plaintiffs could not have brought an action in Illinois
against the Texas defendants. Because the Texas defendants
might have brought an action in an Illinois federal court against
the Illinois plaintiffs for a declaratory judgment that the patent
was invalid or was not infringed, this proposed third interpreta-
tion would authorize the transfer.3 2
To interpolate "by the party seeking the transfer" at the
end of the phrase "where it might have been brought" may not
be the reading which first comes to mind. However, this inter-
pretation produces more sensible results than do the interpreta-
tions of majority and dissent in Blaski. It is an interpretation
31. Under the proposed interpretation, the concern is not whether such a hypotheti-
cal action would be appropriate as a matter of declaratory judgment practice; the ques-
tion is only whether personal jurisdiction and venue would be satisfied for such an
action.
32. Another example is Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), companion case to
Blaski. Residents of New York and Illinois brought a shareholder derivative action in
Illinois federal court, on behalf of a Utah corporation, against an Indiana corporation
which controlled the Utah corporation. Id. at 338. Because the Indiana corporation was
not subject to Utah personal jurisdiction, the Blaski majority rejected a transfer to Utah.
Because the action was on behalf of a Utah corporation, most of whose "indepen-
dent" stock was held by Utah residents, there is a reasonable argument that the Indiana
corporation defendant (as a hypothetical plaintiff) could have satisfied personal jurisdic-
tion and venue over all shareholders in Utah in an action for a declaratory judgment of
non-liability. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (a
state court has jurisdiction to settle a trustee's accounts in regard to non-resident benefi-
ciaries, in effect a declaratory judgment that the trustee is not liable to the beneficiaries).
It that argument is accepted, the proposed interpretation would permit the transfer. Cf.
Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524-26 (1947) (headquarters of
organization on whose behalf derivative action is brought is frequently the most appro-
priate forum, contrary to normal presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum).
[1988
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the language will bear, it is consistent with the available legisla-
tive history, and it is not precluded by judicial interpretation.3
IV. POLICY
Let us consider first the results of the competing
interpretations.
Allowing defendants to obtain transfers only to a court in
which they could have brought mirror-image actions, as would
be the case if the proposed interpretation were to replace the
Blaski majority's, has a certain natural appeal. Under either a
section 1404(a) transfer or an original service of process, a liti-
gant is forced to go to a particular court or else forfeit the litiga-
tion. Why should a plaintiff, who could not be forced into a par-
ticular court by someone filing a complaint and seeking service
of process, be forced to go there by a defendant invoking section
1404(a)?
The anomalous results produced by the majority's interpre-
tation-an interstate defendant can transfer a local plaintiff an-
ywhere, but a local defendant can transfer an interstate plaintiff
nowhere34-disappears if "where it might have been brought"
means where the moving party [here, the defendant] can satisfy
personal jurisdiction and venue in regard to the other party. In
an action by Local against Interstate, 5 Interstate could obtain a
transfer only to districts in which it could satisfy personal juris-
diction and venue as to Local (if the proposed interpretation re-
places that now prevailing). This would most probably allow
transfers only to Local's residence and to where the claim arose,
a substantial reduction in potential transferee districts. In an ac-
tion by Interstate against Local, in contrast, Local could obtain
a transfer to any district (if the transfer would promote conve-
nience and justice) because Interstate is subject to personal ju-
risdiction and venue in all districts. Thus, if the proposed inter-
pretation replaces the prevailing interpretation, a litigant can be
forced to go to a particular court by a 1404(a) transfer only if
that litigant could be forced to go there by service of process in
an original action. Whether the proposed interpretation replaces
33. Again it should be noted that there are two arguments here. The proposed inter-
pretation may either supplement or replace the Blaski majority's.
34. This dichotomy was discussed supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
35. The Local-Interstate hypothetical was introduced supra text accompanying note
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or supplements the current interpretation, if a party could be
forced there by service of process, that party could also be
forced there by a 1404(a) transfer.
As would that of the Blaski dissenters, the proposed inter-
pretation creates additional potential transferee forums (subject
of course to the convenience and justice requirement), in accord
with the canon that remedial statutes should be broadly con-
strued. 6 Because the new potential transferee forums are those
where an action could have been brought against the party re-
sisting transfer, one would expect that these forums would tend
not to be inconvenient for the resisting party. In contrast, the
interpretation of the Blaski dissenters (that "where it might
have been brought" includes wherever defendant now consents)
would impose no principled limit on transferee forums, many of
which might be quite inconvenient for plaintiff. The proposed
interpretation does increase potential forums, but the increase is
limited and principled, so that "where it might have been
brought" continues to be a substantial restriction. In contrast,
the interpretation of the Blaski dissenters would, as a practical
matter, eliminate that restriction whenever it is defendant (as it
most commonly is) who seeks the transfer.
Thus the proposed interpretation responds to the concerns
of the Blaski dissenters. Yet it avoids the problems the dissent
would create and accordingly is responsive to the majority's con-
cerns. Thus as a matter of policy, the proposed interpretation is
sensible, much more so than that of either majority or dissent.
V. LANGUAGE
Is the proposed interpretation one the language of the stat-
ute will bear? Two problems are apparent. First, the statute is
written in terms of an "action." Can that term include, not only
the action that was in fact filed, but also a hypothetical mirror-
image of that action, the hypothetical action brought by the de-
fendant in the true action? There has been some judicial flexi-
bility in interpreting the term "action" in section 1404: That
term has been held to include a part of an action.3 7 Thus if cer-
36. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964).
37. See Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
977 (1968); see also Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1148 (5th
Cir. 1984). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3845 (1986).
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tain claims or parties could not be transferred because they
would not satisfy the "where it might have been brought" re-
quirement, they may be severed and retained and the remainder
of the case transferred. This flexibility might suggest that an
"action" could include the real action's hypothetical mirror-
image.
Statutes and even the Constitution in many analogous areas
have been interpreted to include within the term "action" the
true action's hypothetical mirror-image. For example, in deter-
mining whether or not an action arises under federal law so as to
satisfy federal subject matter jurisdiction,38 a declaratory judg-
ment action is treated as a hypothetical action for mandatory
relief.39 Similarly, in determining whether the amount in contro-
versy requirement 0 was satisfied in an action by an insurance
company to set aside a workmen's compensation award, the
Court looked to the amount of the claim the defendant em-
ployee was expected to assert in a hypothetical action for an in-
creased award. 41 In determining right to jury trial42 in an action
for declaratory relief, it appears that the Court looks to a hypo-
thetical action for mandatory relief and asks whether that action
would be legal or equitable.43 In light of these analogies, it does
not strain the term "action" to have it include a hypothetical
mirror-image action brought by the defendant in the true action.
Second, the statute refers to where an action "might have
been brought." Is one restricted to interpolating at the end "By
the plaintiff," or might one ask, "Brought by whom?" and then
interpolate, "By the party seeking the transfer." As above, if
"action" includes a hypothetical mirror-image action, "Brought
by whom?" should be a permissible question, and its answer
should in appropriate cases be the defendant. Suggesting a novel
38. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
39. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1
(1983); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
40. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, and [diversity or alienage is
satisfied]." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982).
41. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
42. "In suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ..
U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
43. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Similarly, that case
also held that a legal counterclaim (somewhat analogous to a hypothetical mirror-image
action) may create a right to jury trial.
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answer, to an unarticulated question with an apparent answer,
may be a sensible method of statutory interpretation. For exam-
ple, Justice Harlan suggested that the requirement that "the
complaint [in a shareholder derivative action] shall be verified
by oath,""' although apparently contemplating verification by
the plaintiff, could also be satisfied by verification by counsel.45
In other areas courts have departed from a statute's words
to achieve it purposes. In the tax area, for example, the Court
held that a transaction literally within the statutory definition of
a corporate reorganization would not be so treated.46 Lower
courts have held that transactions not literally within the corpo-
rate reorganization provisions would nonetheless be subject to
them.47 To reject the initially appealing interpretation of "where
it might have been brought" produces a sensible result and is
consistent with the general concerns the Congress expressed in
enacting section 1404(a), and is thus in accord with these
examples.45
Thus, the language of section 1404(a) may be reasonably in-
terpreted as including a mirror-image actidn, brought by the
party seeking the transfer, to supplement the prevailing inter-
pretation. It is more difficult but still possible to have that pro-
posed interpretation replace the Blaski majority's.
VI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
We turn now from the statute's language to its legislative
history. Section 1404(a) was enacted as part of the 1948 revision
of the Judicial Code.49 Because of the magnitude of the revision,
particular provisions may have little legislative history. The sub-
stance of the legislative history of section 1404(a) is contained in
the reviser's notes:
Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of
44. Now Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
45. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 374 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
46. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
47. See, e.g., Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 886 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967); Answering Serv. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974),
afl'd, 546 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
48. Hart and Sacks suggest that words in a statute may be given more unusual
meanings if addressed to judges (as Section 1404(a) is) than if addressed to private per-
sons (as the tax code is). H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1412-13 (Tent. ed.
1958).
49. 62 Stat. 869, 937 (1948).
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forum non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more conven-
ient forum, even though the venue is proper. As an example of
the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Kepner, 62 S. Ct. 6, 314 U.S. 44, 86 L.Ed. 28 (1941), which was
prosecuted under the Federal Employer's [sic] Liability Act in
New York, although the accident occurred and the employee
resided in Ohio. [Kepner held that a state court could not en-
join an employee's prosecution in a federal court of an action
under FELA, and it strongly suggested that federal courts
could not apply forum non conveniens to FELA actions.] The
new subsection requires the court to determine that the trans-
fer is necessary for convenience of the parties and witnesses,
and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so. 0
These notes do not address the "where it might have been
brought" limitation, but they do suggest that general guidance
might be obtained by examining the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens as it then stood. The late Professor Braucher in an arti-
cle published the year before the revision was enacted discussed
two contrasting themes contained in the doctrine of forum non
conveniens: an original theme of abuse of process and a develop-
ing theme of trial convenience.51
Let us examine a case where plaintiff's choice of forum con-
stitutes an abuse of process: the forum is not plaintiff's resi-
dence, nor where the claim arose, nor defendant's principal place
of business, nor the residence of any witnesses; it is rather se-
lected solely for improper reasons such as the reputed generosity
of its juries or its proximity to plaintiff's attorney's office.2 In
50. H.R REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 132 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. A 127 (1946). There is a discussion of the legislative history of section
1404(a) in Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58-71 (1949).
51. Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. REV. 908 (1947). For
more general discussions see Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF.
L. REV. 380 (1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929) Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 HARV. L. REV.
1217 (1930) [hereinafter Place of Trial I]; Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application
of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARV. L. REV. 41 (1930) [hereinafter Place of
Trial II]. "Abuse of process" is used here for its general, non-technical meaning, not as a
term of art referring to a particular tort. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 121 (5th ed. 1984).
52. This description could reasonably be applied to several of the inconvenient fo-
rum cases decided by the Supreme Court. See Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (Ken-
tucky was plaintiff's residence and accident site, but case was filed in Illinois); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (Virginia was plaintiff's residence and accident site,
but case was filed in New York); Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941)
(Ohio was plaintiff's residence and accident site, but case was filed in New York); see
also Barrett, supra note 51, at 382 n.13, 383 n.16.
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such a case-it may be argued-a dismissal or stay under forum
non conveniens, or a transfer under section 1404(a), in effect
says: This is not a proper forum, although it technically satisfies
venue and personal jurisdiction, because it was so abusively cho-
sen.5 3 Plaintiff thus not having properly begun the action, the
action may be sent to a forum which would be proper. To trans-
fer rather than dismiss saves the plaintiff having to refile. In
such circumstances it is sensible to interpolate "by the plaintiff"
after "where it might have been brought." Thus interpolating
"by the party seeking transfer" should not replace the prevailing
interpretation.
There are two responses to this argument. First, it is un-
likely that section 1404(a) is based on the "abuse of process"
concept of forum non conveniens. Neither the statute nor the
reviser's notes use the language of abuse of process: terms such
as vex, harass, oppress, or impose and their derivatives.54
Rather, both statute and notes use the terms of trial conve-
nience: "convenience" and "justice."55 At most the preceding ar-
gument would apply only to the relatively few cases under sec-
tion 1404(a) in which plaintiff's initial choice of forum may
fairly be characterized as abusive, a narrow sub-class of the
"trial convenience" cases.
Second, even if there has been an abuse of process, the pre-
ceding argument merely shows why the case cannot proceed in
the forum plaintiff initially chose. It does not dictate the choice
among transferee forums. If an action were dismissed under fo-
rum non conveniens, plaintiff could refile it only in one of the
courts where the original action "might have been brought," but
the choice among those courts would be plaintiff's (subject, of
course, to a second application of forum non conveniens). As fo-
rum non conveniens operated, the only court in which plaintiff
could be forced to be was a court in which plaintiff was subject
to personal jurisdiction and venue for a mirror-image action
brought by the defendant.
Alternatively, defendant, rather than asking the abusively-
chosen forum to dismiss, might ask another court to enjoin
53. See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 532 (1947).
54. See Braucher, supra note 51, at 930-31.
55. Braucher suggests that the focus of Section 1404(a), under consideration by the
Congress at the time he wrote his article, is trial convenience. Id. at 933; see also Nor-
wood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) (section 1404(a) allows transfer even when forum
non conveniens dismissal would be improper).
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plaintiff from proceeding in that forum. 6 This approach, too,
would require defendant going to a court having venue and per-
sonal jurisdiction over plaintiff.
Thus there is a fair argument that even if plaintiff's choice
of forums constituted an abuse of process, transferee forums
should be limited to those in which plaintiff was subject to
venue and personal jurisdiction.
The "trial convenience" concept did permit consideration of
forums other than those in which the action "might have been
brought" by the plaintiff. An action might be stayed or dis-
missed in a particular forum, even though plaintiff had no other
forum available at the time the action was commenced, if de-
fendant would consent to jurisdiction in the more convenient fo-
rum.57 Thus the "trial convenience" concept of forum non con-
veniens, suggested by the legislative history to be the basis of
section 1404(a), is inconsistent with interpolation of "by the
plaintiff" after "where it might have been brought."
The silence in the legislative history of Section 1404(a) in
regard to the "where it might have been brought" restriction is
noteworthy. A court in applying forum non conveniens before
the enactment of section 1404(a) could only dismiss or stay an
action, not transfer it. While the court would consider the avail-
ability of other possible forums, it could not send the case to any
of them. Of course a restriction on transfer becomes relevant
only with the authorization of transfers. Full appreciation of the
problems of transfers and the need for restrictions may take
time to develop.58 The silence in the legislative history on the
56. See Place of Trial I, supra note 51, at 1240-41.
57. Several cases had approved forum non conveniens dismissals based on defend-
ant accepting service of process in the more convenient forum. See, e.g., Canada Malting
Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 424 (1932); Strassburger v. Singer Mfg. Co., 263
A.D. 518, 33 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1942). Additional cases are cited in the dissent to Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 351, 364 (1960), and in Braucher, supra note 51, at 932 n.139; see
also, Foster, Place of Trial II, supra note 51, at 50-51. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert Storage
& Transfer Co., 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947), states that forum non conveniens "presupposes
at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process . . . ." This terse
statement could be satisfied if the second forum were created by the defendant's con-
sent, and thus need not be inconsistent with the position stated in the text. If the state-
ment is inconsistent with the text, it may be noted that the statement is dictum and is
without citation of authority. See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981),
in which defendants consented to jurisdiction and to waive the statute of limitations in
the more convenient forum.
58. The sequence of thinking about transfers on defendant's motion might begin
with the thought that making provision for transfer would seem to aid the plaintiff.
Plaintiff is spared the expense of commencing another action, the risk of not being able
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matter of restricting transfers suggests that Congress did not fo-
cus on this problem.
What can one conclude that Congress decided? Congress
enacted a broad concept of forum non conveniens, trial conve-
nience rather than abuse of process.
Congress decided to have transfers, rather than dismissals
or stays. By providing for transfer rather than dismissal, Con-
gress would seem to have been moved by concern for certain le-
gitimate interests of the plaintiff. A transfer avoids the risks of
difficulty in serving process or of the running of the statute of
limitations, which are present in a dismissal. It would seem in-
consistent with that concern to allow plaintiff to be transferred
to a distant forum with which plaintiff has no connection,
merely because defendant has sufficient contacts with that fo-
rum to satisfy personal jurisdiction and venue.
Congress chose not to leave transfers to the trial judge's dis-
cretion under the loose "convenience" and "justice" require-
ment, nor to tempt parties into litigating about all sorts of possi-
bly convenient or just forums, but instead imposed the
additional "where it might have been brought" requirement.
The proposed interpretation-if it replaces that now prevail-
ing-provides that additional protection to a local plaintiff suing
an interstate defendant; the conventional interpretation does
not.
But Congress did not focus on the content of the "where it
might have been brought" restriction. It did not address the
question, "Brought by whom?" It did not determine that the re-
striction must be interpreted according to the initially apparent
meaning of the words, rather than in a more principled and sen-
sible manner. To interpret the restriction as referring only to
where the moving party could have brought an action would
provide principled protection to the party resisting transfer; to
interpret the restriction as also including where the moving
party could have brought that action increases available trans-
feree forums in a principled manner. The Blaski majority's in-
to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in the new action, and the risk that the statute
of limitations may run. Upon further reflection, one might perceive that transfer also
creates a burden on the plaintiff. Plaintiff is forced to go to the transferee forum. Only a
still deeper understanding will reveal that a limit cast in terms of where plaintiff might
bring an action will be arbitrary. Those places are dictated by concepts of venue and
personal jurisdiction created to protect the defendant, yet it is plaintiff who needs pro-
tection when the action is being transferred.
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terpretation, in contrast, imposes an arbitrary limit on trans-
feree forums unrelated to any interest of the party. Moreover,
the majority's interpretation is inconsistent with the cases where
dismissal under forum non conveniens was conditioned on de-
fendant consenting to jurisdiction in a more convenient forum, a
forum in which the action could not have been brought by the
plaintiff.59 Yet, unlike that of the Blaski dissent, the proposed
interpretation gives the limitation significant content. The legis-
lative history, while too sparse to provide more than general
guidance, is more in accord with the interpretation proposed
here than with the interlretations chosen by either the majority
or the dissent in Blaski.
VII. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The Blaski majority interpolates "by the plaintiff" at the
end of "where it might have been brought":
But the power of a District Court under § 1404(a) to transfer
an action to another district is made to depend not upon the
wish or waiver of the defendant but, rather, upon whether the
transferee district was one in which the action "might have
been brought" by the plaintiff.6 0
Such an interpolation seems at first blush to reject the argument
advanced here. That statement, however, was made for another
purpose, as the context makes clear. The reference to "by the
plaintiff" is not in contrast to, "by the party seeking the trans-
fer," the interpretation proposed here, but to "by the wish or
waiver of the defendant," the interpretation unsuccessfully ad-
vanced there by petitioners. This reading is made clear by the
majority's statement of the issue to be decided: "Petitioners'
'thesis' and sole claim is that . . .'where it might have been
brought' should be held to relate not only to the time of the
bringing of the action, but also to the time of the transfer
,,61
The majority accepts the issue as tendered by petitioners,
then rejects the petitioners' interpretation. The majority is stat-
ing, not what the statute means, but that the statute does not
mean what petitioners contend. The words chosen by the major-
ity reflect, not a consideration of the various possible interpreta-
59. See supra note 57.
60. 363 U.S. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
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tions of "where it might have been brought," but merely use of
one natural meaning of that phrase as a short-hand for rejecting
petitioners' interpretation. Not having considered other possible
interpretations, the majority did not reject them. 2 Words cho-
sen by the Court for one purpose are likely to mislead if applied
without analysis to another.
It should be noted that the concerns raised by the Blaski
majority are resolved by the proposed interpretation. The theory
the majority rejected was that "where it might have been
brought" referred, not only to the time the action was com-
menced, but to the time of the motion to transfer as well. 3 The
proposed interpretation looks only to the time the action was
commenced. The Blaski majority expressed concern that the
theory it was rejecting would "inject gross discrimination," be-
cause that theory would allow the defendant, merely because he
was the defendant, to qualify for transfer (subject to the conve-
nience and justice requirement) to a district to which plaintiff
could not obtain transfer (no matter how convenient)." The pro-
posed interpretation does indeed provide different treatment for
plaintiff and defendant, but the difference is principled rather
than discriminatory. Either party may obtain a transfer to a dis-
trict in which that party could have brought the action (or its
mirror-image) under the supplemental version of the proposed
interpretation, and under the replacing version those are the
only districts to which transfers are allowed. Because the pro-
posed interpretation responds to the concerns of the Blaski ma-
jority, and because the language in that opinion superficially
hostile to the proposed interpretation was intended for another
purpose, Blaski at least is not authority against the proposed
interpretation, and it might even provide a little support.6 5
62. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in Robbins v. Cali-
fornia [453 U.S. 420 (1981)]. . . . Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis
does not preclude this action. . . . [A]lthough we reject the precise holding in
Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its judg-
ment, and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by the parties in
that case.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. 363 U.S. at 342-43.
64. Id. at 344.
65. Research has uncovered one judicial statement that defendant cannot obtain a
transfer to a district in which plaintiff was not subject to personal jurisdiction. Arvidson
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 107 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Wash. 1952). This statement, while not
quite the interpretation proposed here, is close enough to provide some support for that
[1988
SECTION 1404(a)
The proposed interpretation finds some support by analogy
from a case such as A.J. Industries, Inc. v. United States Dis-
trict Court68 holding that "where [an action] might have been
brought" includes districts where it might have been asserted as
a counterclaim in an action then pending there. That the plain-
tiff in the transferred action was defending another action in the
transferee district suggests that that plaintiff was subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue in the transferee district. Thus a
transfer in these cases would satisfy the interpretation proposed
here. That interpretation is broader than these cases because it
does not require that there be another action pending in the
transferee district with the parties reversed (a relatively unlikely
circumstance, it would seem). It is enough that personal jurisdic-
tion and venue would be proper for such an action.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have considered the policies of three possible interpreta-
tions of "where it might have been brought."
The Blaski majority would interpolate at the end, "by the
plaintiff." This interpretation provides no protection to some
parties needing protection against transfer, while allowing other
parties to veto transfers not objectively harmful to their inter-
ests. The Blaski dissent would interpolate "with defendant's
consent." This interpretation allows transfer based on defend-
ant's waiver, although it is normally the plaintiff's interest a
transfer jeopardizes. The proposed interpretation interpolates
"by the party seeking the transfer," normally the defendant.
This interpretation by replacing the Blaski majority's would
provide to the person being forced into a particular court the
normal protection of the right to insist venue and personal juris-
interpretation. Unfortunately the statement was by a district court rather than a higher
court; it was an alternative ground; there was no explanation or citation of relevant au-
thority, and the only judicial citations to this case on this issue revealed by shepardizing
is by the dissenters in Blaski. 363 U.S. at 357 n.8. Thus the support provided is slight.
66. 503 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1974); see also A.T.& T. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 428 F.
Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Simplifying the facts in A.J. Industries, a California resident
brought an action against a Delaware resident in Delaware. Thereafter the Delaware resi-
dent brought an action against the California resident in California. 503 F.2d at 385-86.
Normally the California action could not have been brought by the Delaware resident in
Delaware for lack of personal jurisdiction over the California defendant. However, the
California action could have been asserted as a counterclaim in the Delaware action.
That the claim could have thus been asserted was held to satisfy the "might have been
brought" requirement. Id. at 387.
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diction be satisfied; as a supplement to the Blaski majority's, it
would allow a party to be transferred to any court to which that
party could be summoned. Thus as a matter of policy the pro-
posed interpretation produces the most sensible results, perhaps
the only sensible results.
Statutory analysis is, of course, more than a choice of social
policies. One must look to the statute's language and to its legis-
lative history to see what policy the legislature chose; one must
look to judicial interpretation to see what the judges have deter-
mined that choice to have been. Each of these factors at the very
least permits, and on balance they support the proposed inter-
pretation.
Two related versions of the proposed interpretation have
been presented: the proposed interpretation merely supple-
ments, or it totally replaces, the prevailing interpretation. The
first may be accepted although the second is rejected, but the
second too is sensible and supportable. Perhaps, however, the
validity of the second or replacement version need not be ad-
dressed. Appropriate judicial sensitivity to plaintiff's conve-
nience may in most cases preclude transfers to places to which
plaintiff could not be summoned under the normal rules of per-
sonal jurisdiction and venue.
Finally, although this article has addressed how a court
might interpret section 1404(a)'s "where it might have been
brought" limitation, the analysis would be equally appropriate
for legislation amending that limitation by adding at the end
"by the party seeking the transfer."
[1988
